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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
ROY W. HALL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 89-0262-CA 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant relies on his opening brief, and refers this 
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues, 
the case, the facts, and summary of the argument• Appellant 
responds to the State's answer to the opening brief as follows: 
I. 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN LIMITING THE VOIR DIRE OF APPELLANT'S JURORS• 
A. REFUSAL TO ASK REQUESTED VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS 
Respondent initially claims that the record in 
insufficient to support Appellant's claim that the trial court 
failed to ask requested voir dire questions. As reflected in 
pages 68 through 71 of the transcript, the trial court gave 
Appellant the opportunity to make a record of the bench 
conference during which the additional voir dire questions were 
requested. Appellant recognizes that the trial court did not 
think that Appellant had requested that the jurors be questioned 
regarding their acquaintances in the county attorney's office (T. 
1 Respondent's brief at 6. 
1 
69), but notes that defense counsel indicated that she did ask 
the court to inquire into that topic (T. 69)• The trial court 
specifically recognized that defense counsel's objections to the 
court's failure to ask the requested questions were timely, 
stating, "[Y]ou have your record." (T* 71). 
Appellant counters the State's assertion that Appellant 
has failed to demonstrate the relevance of the requested voir 
2 
dire questions by reference to the standard of propriety of 
voir dire questions set forth by the Utah Supreme Court: 
All that is necessary for a voir dire 
question to be appropriate is that it allow 
"defense counsel to exercise his peremptory 
challenges more intelligently." 
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (1988). The questions 
requested by Appellant and refused by the trial court (questions 
concerning juror leadership roles, experience as jury 
forepersons, study of law, experience in the military, 
relationship with members of the county attorney's office, 
membership in the LDS church, views on the crime of rape, and 
views on the punishment in this case) would have given defense 
counsel insight into the perspectives of the prospective jurors 
and allowed her to exercise peremptory challenges more 
intelligently, and were thus "relevant" voir dire questions under 
Utah law. 
Finally, Appellant has shown prejudice resulting from 
the trial court's failure to ask the requested voir dire 
2 Respondent's brief at 6, 7. 
2 
questions; as a result of the trial court's failure to ask the 
voir dire questions, Appellant was tried by a jury led by a 
foreperson related to the deputy county attorney (T. 353-405). 
Compare State v, Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1056-1060 (Utah 
1984)(reversible error committed in trial for driving under the 
influence of alcohol when trial court refused to ask voir dire 
question relating to the religious basis for juror abstention 
from drinking, when abstinent juror sat on jury)• 
B. STIFLING MOTIF IN CONDUCTING VOIR DIRE 
The state indirectly defends the trial court's 
dictating answers to voir dire questions, by claiming that 
Appellant failed to provide legal analysis or authority in 
raising the issue, and failed to show prejudice resulting from 
the court's dictating the answers to the voir dire questions. 
The legal authority and analysis that supports 
Appellant's objections and concerns about the trial court's 
dictating answers to voir dire questions is found at pages 6-12 
of Appellant's opening brief. In summary, the Utah Constitution 
Article 1 sections 7, 10, and 12, and the fifth and sixth 
amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee Appellant 
a fair trial. Inadequate voir dire violates a defendant's right 
to a fair trial. To be adequate, voir dire should be conducted 
3 Respondent claims otherwise. Respondent's brief page 
7. 
4 Appellant's opening brief at 9. 
5 Appellant's opening brief at 8, 9, citing State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 448, 448 (Utah 1988). 
3 
6 
in a manner which reveals latent biases of jurors. In dictating 
the answers to the questions, and in refusing to entertain 
7 
questions from the jurors, the court effectively told the jurors 
not to reveal their known biases, and squelched any possibility 
of evoking responses indicative of latent biases.^ j n conducting 
the voir dire in this purpose-defeating manner, the court 
9 
violated appellant's right to a fair trial. 
As Appellant noted in the opening brief, the court's 
manner of conducting the voir dire resulted in a dearth of 
information about the jury panel. This lack of information not 
only hindered Appellant's ability to exercise his peremptory 
6 Appellant's opening brief at 8, 11-12, citing State v. 
Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1984); State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 
839, 844-845 (Utah 1988). 
7 The State apparently interpreted the court as willing 
to entertain questions from jurors on an individual basis. 
Respondent's brief at 8. 
When Juror 1 asked permission to ask the court a 
question, the court responded, "Now, ma'am, when you say ask a 
question, let me continue. I don't want to start opening it up 
for questions because it's just not wise. If I need to, I'll 
take you separatly [sic] and see what your question is." (T. 
37). 
Appellant asserts that when the court told the jurors 
that he would entertain questions from them on an individual 
basis if the court saw fit, and then failed to take the question 
from the Juror 1 on an individual basis, the court in essence 
told the jurors that their questions were not welcomed unless 
requested by the court. In refusing to allow the jurors to ask 
questions during the voir dire, the court may have missed the 
opportunity to clarify voir dire questions for the jurors, and 
discouraged the jurors from participating in the voir dire in an 
open and meaningful fashion. 
8 Appellant's opening brief at 9-11, citing transcript 
pages 35-55). 
9 Appellant's opening brief at 6, 7. 
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challenges effectively, but also hinders his ability to point 
specifically to evidence of prejudice resulting from the court's 
manner of conducting voir dire. Appellant again refers this 
Court to State v> Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988), where the 
court explained that cases involving particularly abhorrent 
publicized facts, and involving weak evidence of guilt, 
effective voir dire is crucial. Ici. at 845. Because this case 
involved abhorrent and publicized facts, and because this case 
had weak evidence of Appellant's intent, a thorough voir dire was 
essential, and the trial court's failure to conduct the voir dire 
properly created a great risk of harm to Appellant. In these 
circumstances, where the threat of prejudice is great, but 
specific proof of prejudice cannot be shown, it should be 
presumed. Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972)(plurality 
opinion)(recognizing that because prejudice in racist jury 
selection is so pervasive and harmful, and yet so difficult to 
prove, it should be presumed). 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING 
THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF JESSICA HADFIELD. 
In response to Appellant's observation that the trial 
court violated the hearsay rule in admitting the seven speech 
board messages into evidence, the State first argues that the 
admission of the statements did not violate Appellant's right to 
confrontation. The State's confrontation clause analysis, 
10 Appellant's brief at 14, 
5 
however, is inapplicable to Appellant's hearsay objection. The 
hearsay rule and the confrontation clause are separate and 
different, California v. Green, 399 U,S. 149, 155-156 (1970), and 
Appellant is not claiming that the admission of the speech board 
messages violated his right to confrontation. 
The argument provided by the State that applies to 
Appellant's argument concerning the hearsay rule is that any 
error committed in the admission of the speech board messages was 
either waived or rendered harmless by defense counsel's 
discussion of the messages during cross-examination. 
Respondent's brief at 11-13. 
Before Appellant began addressing the speech board 
messages, he was granted a continuing hearsay objection (T. 
112). After the prosecutor was allowed to admit the evidence 
over Appellant's objection, Appellant was entitled to examine 
witnesses concerning the evidence, and did not waive his 
objection in doing so. See e.g., State v. Guinn, 752 P.2d 632, 
636 (Idaho App. 1988)(after motion to suppress is denied and 
evidence is admitted, defendant's introduction of testimony on 
that evidence does not waive objection to its admissibility). 
Had Appellant been the party to introduce testimony 
concerning the speech board messages, Respondent's argument that 
Appellant's discussion of the speech board messages rendered the 
State's discussion of them harmless error would be appropriate. 
However, it was only after the court determined that the speech 
board messages were admissible and the prosecution introduced 
6 
testimony about them that Appellant had a need to address the 
messages. Appellant's attempts to defuse the impact of the 
speech board messages should not translate the admission of the 
evidence into harmless error - Appellant has a right to a fair 
trial and a right to an appeal, and should not be forced to 
choose between the two. 
Appellant maintains that the speech board messages were 
inadmissible hearsay statements, which prejudiced Appellant's 
case. They improperly bolstered the testimony of Jessica 
Hadfield and were admitted solely to induce the jurors to 
convict Appellant because they sympathized with Jessica 
Hadfield8s victimization. 
III. 
THE COURT'S PERFORMANCE 
DURING THE SENTENCING PHASE OF 
APPELLANT'S TRIAL WAS ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS, AND DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS. 
Apparently because Appellant has not yet succeeded in 
supplementing the record in this case with the press coverage of 
12 
the proceedings in the trial court, to which press coverage 
11 Appellant encourages the members of this Court to view 
Exhibit 1 and to notice the torn and crumpled condition of some 
of the speech board messages, yet another overture to the jurors 
to sympathize with the pain felt by Jessica Hadfield. 
12 On June 30, 1989, Appellant first moved in this Court 
to supplement the record in this case with all press coverage of 
this case. This motion was based on the grounds that the trial 
court indicated it had been exposed to the press coverage of the 
case. On July 26, 1989, this Court denied the motion, apparently 
because Appellant did not specify the news items to be added to 
the record. 
On July 31, 1989, Appellant amended the motion to 
supplement the record with the specific items of news coverage of 
the case that the trial court admitted having watched and read. 
7 
Judge Wilkinson admitted his exposure, Respondent claims that 
there is no evidence that the trial court was influenced by the 
press in sentencing Appellant. Respondent's brief at 13-16* 
While Appellant is hopeful that the record in this case 
will eventually contain the press coverage of this case that 
Judge Wilkinson admitted having read and watched, Appellant's 
claim that the trial court violated due process in conducting the 
sentencing phase of Appellant's trial stands, regardless of the 
supplementation of the record. 
Appellate counsel concedes that the media coverage of 
this case other than that to which Judge Wilkinson admitted 
exposure is not relevant to this case and should not have been 
13 included in the appendix to Appellant's opening brief. 
However, it is appropriate for this Court to read the Salt Lake 
14 
Tribune article which Judge Wilkinson admitted having read and 
for this Court to view the videotape of the KUTV news 
This Court denied that amended motion on August 3, 1989, 
apparently because the trial court had not been given the 
opportunity to rule on the motion. 
Appellant then moved in the trial court to supplement 
the record with the specific items of news coverage to which the 
court had been exposed, as indicated on the record during the 
sentencing phase of this case. The trial court denied this 
motion August 30, 1989. 
The trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to 
supplement the record is currently on appeal before this Court 
in case number 890532-CA, which appeal, by order of this Court 
dated September 14, 1989, will be briefed in ten page memoranda 
and consolidated with the instant appeal during oral arguments. 
13 Appellate counsel, Elizabeth Holbrook, is responsible 
for and regrets appending the articles of April 15, 1988, 
November 20, 1988, and November 22, 1988. 
14 Article of November 19, 1988. 
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broadcasts which Judge Wilkinson admitted having watched during 
the sentencing phase of Appellant's trial (T.2 14, 30, 35). This 
fact is supported by reference to State v. Harvey, 491 P.2d 660 
(Wash.App. 1971). 
In Harvey, the defendant pled guilty to three counts of 
armed robbery. Id., at 661. On appeal, he challenged, inter 
alia, his ability to enter the guilty pleas. IcI. In raising the 
issue of competency on appeal, the defendant appended an 
affidavit indicating that at the time the crimes were committed, 
and apparently at the time he entered the guilty pleas, he was 
under the custody of a mental hospital. Jxi. at 662. While the 
affidavit was not presented to the trial court, and therefore was 
not technically evidence in the record on appeal, the appellate 
court found that the fact that the substance of the affidavit 
was brought to the trial court's attention justified appellate 
consideration. The court stated: 
The affidavit cannot be considered as 
evidence in the case because it was not a 
part of the record on appeal. We can, 
however, consider the affidavit as a part of 
the defendant's brief where it raises a 
constitutional issue and is supported by the 
record. 
Id. at 662 (citation omitted). 
In this case, the record supports Appellant's assertion 
that Judge Wilkinson read the Tribune article and saw the KUTV 
news coverage of November 19, 1988 (T.2 14, 30, 35). Further, 
Appellant asked the court to insulate itself from the press by 
15 Broadcasts on November 19, 1988. 
9 
closing the sentencing proceedings to the press (T.2 13, 44) and 
warned the court that the inflammatory press coverage of the case 
was jeopardizing Appellant's right to a fair sentencing (To2 13). 
The trial court refused to close the sentencing phase to the 
press (T.2 14, 44-45), admitted exposure to the inflammatory 
press coverage (T.2 14, 30, 35), and found that the court was not 
influenced by the exposure to the press (T.2 31). 
Because the Tribune article and KUTV news coverage were 
evaluated by the court below, and because they support 
Appellant's claim that his constitutional rights were violated 
during the sentencing phase, this Court should view those 
articles, regardless of whether or not they are technically made 
part of the record. See Harvey at 662. 
In the event that this Court declines to examine the 
press articles, Appellant notes that the transcripts of the 
sentencing phase provide "record" evidence that the court was 
influenced during the sentencing phase by either the press or by 
the actions of defense counsel. See Appellant's opening brief, 
pages 19-28. Respondent states that due process requires "that 
the trial court's sentence be based on factual information and 
defendant's background." Respondent's brief at 14, citing State 
v. Carson, 597 P.2d 862, 864-865 (Utah 1979). In basing 
Appellant's sentence on either the influence of the press or the 
court's anger at defense counsel, the court violated Appellant's 
right to due process during the sentencing phase of his trial. 
Id. See also Appellant's opening brief, pages 31-34. 
10 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the errors committed during the voir dire of 
the jurors and in the admission of the hearsay speech board 
messages, Appellant is entitled to a new trial. At the very 
least, this Court should remand this case for sentencing that 
complies with standards of due process. 
Respectfully submitted this /X-^day of 
1989. ,?./ 
NANCY 
•efeiidant/ Appellant 
OLBRO 
Attorney Heir Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY AND MAILING 
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that U copies 
of the foregoing were delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, and 
that four copies of the foregoing will mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84114, this (ZdL^yn*; 1989. 
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DELIVERED by _ _ _ this day 
of , 1989. 
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